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9.1 Introduction
Around the globe, traditional pay-as-you-go Social Security systems are
facing ﬁnancial challenges due to demographic changes. With fertility rates
at or below replacement levels in developed countries and life expectancy in
retirement projected to continue increasing, the ratio of beneﬁciaries to
workers will rise over the coming decades, increasing annual costs relative
to income. The imminent retirement of the baby boom generation in many
developed countries has focused attention on the need for reform.1
Over the past decade and more, many analysts have proposed that at
least some of the ﬁnancial shortfalls be eliminated through the prefunding
of future beneﬁts in order to ameliorate the increase in pay-as-you-go tax
rates on future generations of workers that would otherwise be required.2
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1. The Social Security trustees report (Board of Trustees 2006) projects an increase in the
number of beneﬁciaries per hundred workers from thirty in 2005 to forty-nine in 2040 to ﬁfty-
three in 2080 (table IV.B2). For an international description of the demographic challenge, see
World Bank (1994).
2. The Oﬃce of the Chief Actuary at the Social Security Administration has formally
analyzed over two dozen proposals. See the memoranda at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/
solvency/.Prefunding can more readily take place in a system of decentralized per-
sonal retirement accounts (PRAs) than in the Social Security trust fund,
particularly when it is desired to exploit the risk-return trade-oﬀ inherent
in the equity premium and to separate the incremental saving due to
higher Social Security taxes from the rest of the federal government’s bud-
get.3
The possibility that Social Security beneﬁts paid from personal accounts
would be subject to ﬁnancial risk due to stock return volatility, in turn, has
focused attention on ways to limit the risk in investment-based Social Se-
curity reform. Financial risk is of particular concern with respect to low-
income beneﬁciaries, for whom Social Security beneﬁts make up a dispro-
portionate share of their retirement income. Two principal methods of
limiting ﬁnancial risk have been explored in the recent literature. The ﬁrst
is to oﬀer a guarantee to workers that beneﬁts will not fall below a par-
ticular threshold (e.g., 90 percent of scheduled beneﬁts). Feldstein and
Ranguelova (2001a,b) demonstrate that such guarantees can be imple-
mented via long-term options on a stock market index in a manner similar
to conventional portfolio insurance. The second method is to follow pop-
ular ﬁnancial planning strategies that reduce the portfolio allocation in eq-
uities as a worker approaches retirement. Poterba et al. (2006) explore the
eﬃcacy of using such life-cycle strategies in this context.
These two mechanisms share the feature that they introduce bonds
(preferably as inﬂation-indexed securities) into the portfolio in order to
lessen the exposure to equity risk. However, in doing so, these mechanisms
give up the equity premium and thus lose one very important rationale for
including PRAs in the reform. In contrast, the following analysis consid-
ers an alternative approach based on modiﬁcations to the traditional ben-
eﬁt to protect low-earning workers while leaving all workers free to choose
their own PRA portfolios. Such an approach may prove to be useful, par-
ticularly because any restrictions on the portfolio allocations in the PRAs
beyond the determination of which investment choices will be oﬀered are
likely to be untenable as the accounts become larger and more popular.
The most direct way to make sure that low-earning workers do not fall
into poverty in old age is to increase the progressivity of the beneﬁt formula
in the scaled-down version of the traditional system that remains after re-
form. Doing so would lessen the need to provide insurance against possi-
bly low returns in the PRAs because low-income retirees would depend less
on the PRAs to stay out of poverty. To be sure, there have been discussions
of progressive reductions in the traditional beneﬁts as part of a plan to
close the ﬁnancial gap while protecting low-earning workers. This chapter
adds to the literature by quantifying the eﬀect of such changes to the tra-
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3. See Samwick (1999, 2004) for further discussion of the role of PRAs in prefunding future
entitlement beneﬁts.ditional beneﬁt formula on the need to invest PRAs in equity rather than
bonds to achieve a given level of welfare.
This chapter illustrates the link between progressivity and risk using a
stylized framework based on simulations of earnings trajectories and port-
folio returns. The simulations are based on the projected experience of a
cohort of workers corresponding roughly to those born in 1973. To cali-
brate the simulations, traditional retirement beneﬁts are reduced by 40 per-
cent, an amount comparable to what is projected to be required to restore
annual balance to the system in the long term.4 The simulations pair re-
ductions in the traditional beneﬁts of this magnitude with PRAs funded by
contributions of 2 percent of covered earnings each year. The main com-
parisons are between the utility-maximizing portfolio allocations to equi-
ties across the new conﬁgurations of the traditional beneﬁt that are more
versus less progressive.
The key ﬁnding is that under baseline parameters, the most progressive
traditional beneﬁt—a ﬂat beneﬁt independent of earnings—allows the
bottom 30 percent of the earnings distribution to achieve a higher expected
utility than under proportional reductions to the current beneﬁt formula
even if they reduce their PRA investments in equity to zero. An additional
30 percent of earners can lessen their equity investments to some degree
without loss of welfare relative to those available under a proportionally
scaled-back current formula. Under more realistic and less extreme
changes to the traditional beneﬁt, such as that proposed by Liebman,
MacGuineas, and Samwick (2005), about half of the equity risk can be
eliminated for the lowest earnings decile, and some equity risk can be elim-
inated for the bottom six deciles. The optimal allocation to equities in the
PRA is not particularly sensitive to the progressivity of the reductions in
the traditional beneﬁts—in most simulations, the share in equities in-
creases slightly for low earners and decreases slightly for high earners with
more progressive reductions in the traditional beneﬁts.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 9.2 lays out
the simulation framework for both the traditional beneﬁts and the new sys-
tem of PRAs. Section 9.3 discusses the combinations of PRA asset alloca-
tions and reductions in the traditional beneﬁts that will be analyzed. Sec-
tion 9.4 derives the certainty equivalent measure of expected utility that
will be used in the comparisons. Section 9.5 presents the baseline results,
and section 9.6 includes sensitivity tests and a comparison to life-cycle in-
vestment strategies. Section 9.7 concludes.
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4. In 2080, the latest year of the projections in the Social Security trustees report 2006 (table
IV.B1), the annual gap is 5.38 percentage points of taxable payroll, compared to a cost rate
(excluding disability insurance beneﬁts) of 16.27 percentage points of taxable payroll. Thus,
the required reduction is 5.38/16.27   33 percent. However, this ﬁgure assumes that all bene-
ﬁts—including those of current retirees—can be cut by this amount. The need to protect ben-
eﬁts already in payment would lead to a higher cut to beneﬁts yet to be paid.9.2 The Simulation Framework
The model used in the analysis focuses on a cohort of workers who
should expect to have their traditional beneﬁts reduced at some point when
the Social Security system is restored to solvency. Speciﬁcally, the analysis
simulates the experience of the birth cohort of 1973, who will reach their
normal retirement age in 2040, just as the Social Security trust fund is
presently projected to be exhausted. Trust fund exhaustion will necessitate
changes to the system, even if they have not been made before that time.
The analysis assumes, counterfactually, that the workers have been in the
new system since they entered the workforce.
The distribution of earnings at an initial age is assumed to be log-
normal, allowing its parameters to be estimated from the mean and median
of a sample of data. Kunkel (1996) reports the mean and quartiles of the
distribution of earnings by age group for the years 1980 to 1993 based on a
detailed sample of Social Security records. The population of thirty-year-
olds in this analysis is approximated by the twenty-ﬁve to thirty-four-year-
old cohort in Kunkel’s data, and parameters of the log-normal are esti-
mated for each year of Kunkel’s sample.5 These parameters are averaged
across all the sample years, and the resulting distribution is scaled up by the
growth in the average wage index in Social Security through 2003, the last
year for which an estimate of that index is currently available in SSA
(2006). To allow for the analysis of the distributional consequences of
changes to the Social Security beneﬁt formula, the log-normal distribution
is approximated by ten workers who fall at the midpoints of the deciles of
that distribution.
For each such worker, earnings evolve over the life cycle due to deter-
ministic changes in expected earnings and stochastic shocks to earnings
around expected earnings. The results of the following analyses are the dis-
tributions of simulated beneﬁts, where simulations are conducted with
5,000 independent replicates for each of the ten workers representing the
deciles of the initial distribution of earnings. The processes for the growth
in expected earnings are assumed to be identical for all replicates of all
workers. Expected earnings grow each year due to the growth in the na-
tional average wage, approximated here by the average real growth rate of
Social Security covered wages during the 1952 to 2003 period, or 1.1 per-
cent per year. Expected earnings also follow an age-earnings proﬁle, re-
ﬂecting changes in individual productivity and hours worked over the life
cycle. Each worker is assumed to face the age-earnings proﬁle for the least-
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5. The median and mean of a lognormal distribution are given by exp( ) and exp(  
0.5    2), respectively, where exp( ) denotes the exponential function and  and  are the mean
and standard deviation of the underlying normal distribution. The median, therefore, identi-
ﬁes   and the ratio identiﬁes  . The estimated parameters for the group discussed in the text
are {10.2056, 0.5271}.educated group of workers analyzed by Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes
(1994).6 Stochastic deviations from expected earnings follow an AR(1)
process with a correlation coeﬃcient of   0.95 and a standard deviation
of 15 percent.7 Given these parameters, annual earnings are backcasted
from the initial distribution at age thirty (deterministically, at the average
rate of earnings growth) to age twenty-one and then forecasted to age
sixty-seven.8
The Social Security beneﬁt formula depends on the growth in the na-
tional average wage in two places: to determine the maximum taxable earn-
ings on which payroll taxes are paid and to index each year of earnings
for the growth of aggregate earnings during a worker’s career. Because the
framework focuses on the deciles of a single age cohort, the growth in the
national average wage is approximated by the growth rate of this cohort’s
average earnings over its career. Maximum taxable earnings subject to the
payroll tax are projected forward and backward from 2003 (age thirty) us-
ing this growth rate. With these few assumptions, it is possible to get a rea-
sonable approximation of Social Security beneﬁts by applying the beneﬁt
formula to the simulated earnings proﬁles.
In each of the policy scenarios, the traditional beneﬁt is reduced by 40
percent in the aggregate and is augmented by the beneﬁts payable from a
PRA. Personal retirement account contributions are 2 or 3 percent of
earnings (depending on the scenario) up to the maximum taxable earnings
level. Asset returns are based on the annual total returns in tables 2 to 5 of
Ibbotson Associates (2006) for the years 1926 to 2005. Asset classes include
large stocks, small stocks, long-term corporate bonds, long-term govern-
ment bonds, intermediate-term government bonds, and Treasury bills.
These returns are further combined in to an equity portfolio (75 percent
large stocks and 25 percent small stocks), the corporate bond portfolio,
and a government bond portfolio (one third in each of the long-term, in-
termediate-term, and bills). Each age (e.g., forty-ﬁve) in each of the 5,000
replicates is assigned a random year of returns (e.g., 1973) from this eighty-
year span. Each of the ten workers, corresponding to the deciles of the ini-
tial distribution of earnings, therefore, receives the same sequence of re-
turn years. Portfolio allocations are as speciﬁed for each scenario. At
retirement, PRA balances are converted to inﬂation-indexed annuities at a
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6. This proﬁle is approximated by having real earnings grow at annual rates of 2.5 percent
between ages twenty-one and thirty, 1.7 percent between thirty-one and forty, 0.5 percent be-
tween forty-one and ﬁfty, and –1.3 percent through age sixty-seven. This growth is in addition
to the growth in the national average wage.
7. See Topel and Ward (1992) for other, comparable estimates of the wage process.
8. Largely because the sample is constructed around a single deterministic age-earnings
proﬁle and is assumed to be fully employed each year, it understates the cross-sectional vari-
ation in annual earnings each year. For example, the ratio of the 75th to the 25th percentiles
of the earnings distribution at age ﬁfty (or the age group forty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-four) in the simu-
lation is 2.59, compared to 3.30 in Kunkel’s (1996) sample.real interest rate of 3 percent, matching the long-term bond return in the
trustees report.9
9.3 Combining Personal Accounts with a Smaller Traditional Beneﬁt
Several approaches to reducing traditional pay-as-you-go beneﬁts are
considered, all of which reduce aggregate payouts by 40 percent (because all
are designed to restore solvency to the same degree). They diﬀer in the extent
to which they protect the beneﬁts of low earners, whose total retirement in-
comes are more vulnerable to the ﬁnancial risk that may come from PRAs.
At one extreme is a proportional reduction in the traditional beneﬁts, in
which the entire beneﬁt formula is scaled down by 40 percent. This approach
leaves the progressivity of the traditional beneﬁt unchanged and is referred
to as the proportional reduction. At the other extreme, the most progressive
way to reduce traditional beneﬁts is to pay each beneﬁciary the same
amount, regardless of earnings. In this case, Social Security would play a ﬂat
beneﬁt equal to the mean beneﬁt in the system (scaled down by 40 percent).
This method is referred to as the uniform beneﬁt in the following.
Between these two extremes lie other possible approaches. One possibil-
ity is to use a weighted average of the two extremes. The following simula-
tions consider a half-and-half beneﬁt formula that combines the propor-
tional reduction and uniform beneﬁt and then divides the total by two.
Another approach is to reduce beneﬁts progressively based on features of
the current beneﬁt formula. For example, in the reform plan presented by
Liebman, MacGuineas, and Samwick (2005), the replacement rates are
lowered by 25 percent below the ﬁrst bend point in the formula (from 90 to
67.5 percent) and 50 percent above the ﬁrst and second bend points (from
32 and 15 percent to 16 and 7.5 percent).10
In a reformed system, PRAs are added to the traditional beneﬁts to help
maintain total retirement replacement rates. The asset allocation decision
in PRAs in this framework is simply a question of equity relative to bonds.
The following simulations consider time-invariant allocations to equity
ranging from 0 to 100, eﬀectively assuming annual rebalancing to meet this
allocation target.11 For purposes of comparison, three life-cycle strategies
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9. The annuity factor is derived from the period life table from 2002, available at http://
www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/table4c6.html. A dollar of PRA balance translates into $1/13.15
in annual inﬂation-indexed beneﬁts. The denominator in this ﬁgure is the average of the two
factors for men (12.3) and women (14.0), respectively.
10. See SSA (2006) for a description of the Social Security beneﬁt formula. See Goss and
Wade (2005) for an evaluation of the Liebman, MacGuineas, and Samwick (2005) plan. Both
documents can be found at http://www.nonpartisanssplan.com for reference.
11. In reality, a worker might choose to vary the allocation to equities over time as a re-
sponse to realizations of both earnings and investment returns. The assumption of constant
allocations throughout the life cycle greatly simpliﬁes the analysis, in order to focus on the
main trade-oﬀ of progressivity in the beneﬁt formula against the need for low-earning work-
ers to exploit the equity premium. The extension to a dynamic programming that solves for
the optimal portfolio is a subject for future work.are also simulated, in which the allocation to stocks averages 50 percent
but declines linearly with age at rates of 1.0, 1.5, or 2.0 percentage points
per year.
When it evaluates Social Security reform plans, the Oﬃce of the Chief
Actuary at the Social Security Administration assigns mean returns by as-
set type. In recent evaluations, such as Goss and Wade (2005), mean re-
turns have been assumed to be 6.2 percent for equity, 3.2 percent for cor-
porate bonds, and 2.7 for government bonds, net of both inﬂation and a
modest 30 basis point administrative cost. The baseline simulations utilize
these assumptions. To capture the volatility around the mean, the histori-
cal variation in asset returns from 1926 to 2005 reported by Ibbotson As-
sociates (2006) is utilized. Standard deviations are 22.2 percent for equity,
9.2 percent for corporate bonds, and 6.6 percent for government bonds. All
simulations preserve these standard deviations but change the mean re-
turns (by the diﬀerence between the speciﬁed mean return and the mean of
the historical data), allowing for potentially lower equity premiums going
forward than what SSA’s Oﬃce of the Actuary has assumed.12
9.4 Evaluating Risk in Retirement Beneﬁts
In the main simulations, workers are assumed to have constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions, deﬁned over total retirement ben-
eﬁts, b, with risk aversion coeﬃcient  :
u(b)  
Expected utility for the worker representing each decile of the initial
wage distribution is calculated as the average value of u(b) across 5,000 in-
dependently drawn replicates. It, therefore, encompasses the uncertainty
in both portfolio returns and earnings, while also allowing for comparisons
across diﬀerent deciles in the initial earnings distribution.13 As a basis for
comparison across conﬁgurations of the traditional beneﬁt formula and




1   
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12. Social Security reform proposals that include PRAs often stipulate that the balance can
be bequeathed. Bequests are not modeled in this analysis, but this is not an important omis-
sion. Allowing for bequests would simply raise the required contribution rate to the PRA to
ensure that the 2 or 3 percentage points speciﬁed in the simulations go to fund the annuities.
13. Deﬁning the deciles with respect to initial earnings is appropriate in the current frame-
work in which workers are assumed to adopt a single, time-invariant allocation to equities in
their PRAs. An alternative approach to doing distributional analysis would use a measure of
average lifetime earnings to assign workers to deciles. For example, some workers in the low-
est initial earnings decile receive a number of very positive earnings draws and wind up higher
in the distribution of lifetime earnings. For comparison, assigning workers to deciles based on
their average indexed monthly earnings yields an allocation to deciles with a correlation of
0.83 with the deciles of the initial earnings distribution.bCE   {(1    )E[u(b)]}1/(1  )   [E(b1  )]1/(1  )
The certainty equivalent is the retirement beneﬁt that, if received with
certainty, would make the individual equally well oﬀ as facing the uncer-
tain beneﬁt distribution. For a risk averse individual, the certainty equiva-
lent will be less than the expected beneﬁt level, E(b). A higher certainty
equivalent indicates a higher expected utility, and diﬀerences in certainty
equivalents correspond to risk premiums measured in dollar terms.
By construction, the aggregate expected beneﬁts from the traditional
system are identical across all policy scenarios, conditional on the earnings
realizations. This is not true within each decile, as some beneﬁt formulas
are designed to be more progressive than others and thus provide diﬀeren-
tial expected beneﬁts to diﬀerent deciles. Other diﬀerences in certainty
equivalents across the policy scenarios reﬂect diﬀerent exposure to risk,
whether through the traditional beneﬁt formula or the PRA investment
portfolio, or diﬀerent expected beneﬁts through the PRA investment port-
folio.
9.5 Trading oﬀ Progressivity and Risk
Figure 9.1 illustrates the impact of the beneﬁt formula and the equity
share of the PRA portfolio on expected beneﬁts. The graph shows the re-
lationship between expected beneﬁts and the equity share in the PRA port-
folio for the highest and lowest earnings deciles under three diﬀerent ben-
eﬁt formulas: proportional reduction, progressive, and uniform beneﬁt.
The curves for the top decile earner go in that order, and the curves for the
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Fig. 9.1 Expected beneﬁts by beneﬁt formula and equity sharebottom decile go in the reverse order. The proportional reduction is most
generous for the top decile and least generous for the bottom decile. The
uniform beneﬁt is the opposite—most generous for the bottom decile and
least generous for the top decile. The progressive beneﬁt reduction actually
tracks the proportional reduction fairly closely. The half-and-half beneﬁt
formula (not shown) would fall exactly between the proportional reduc-
tion and uniform beneﬁt.14 Because the risk premium on equities is posi-
tive, expected beneﬁts increase in all cases with the portfolio share in equi-
ties. For workers in the bottom (top) decile, increases in the equity share in
the PRA portfolio and increases (decreases) in the progressivity of the tra-
ditional beneﬁt formula are two diﬀerent ways to increase the expected
beneﬁt level.
Figure 9.2 shows the impact of beneﬁt risk on the expected utility of
portfolio choices in the PRA. The horizontal axis shows the portfolio share
of the PRAs invested in equities, and the vertical axis shows the dollar
amount of the expected beneﬁts or expected utility (expressed as a cer-
tainty equivalent). The highest curve shows the expected beneﬁts from a
traditional beneﬁt based on the current formula, reduced by 40 percent to
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14. For the bottom decile, the reductions in the average traditional beneﬁt relative to cur-
rent law are 40, 37.6, 32.2, and 24.3 percent for the proportional, progressive, half-and-half,
and uniform beneﬁt formulas, respectively. For the top decile, the corresponding reductions
are 40, 41.7, 45.6, and 51.1 percent. Table 9A.1 contains the mean beneﬁts by earnings decile
for each traditional beneﬁt formula and for 2 percent PRAs with investments ranging from 0
to 100 percent equity, in 25 percentage point increments.
Fig. 9.2 Expected beneﬁts and certainty equivalents, top decile, baseline caserestore solvency, combined with a PRA funded by contributions of 2 per-
cent of taxable payroll per year. (This is the same curve as the top curve in
ﬁgure 9.1.) The graph is for the highest decile of the earnings distribution.
Expected beneﬁts increase slightly faster than linearly with the equity
share of the portfolio. With a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion of 1, the
certainty equivalent is increasing with the equity share in the portfolio,
though the increase occurs at a decreasing rate. The optimal equity share
is, therefore, 100. As the coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion increase to 3
and 5 in the next two curves, the optimal equity share falls to 80 percent
and 60 percent, respectively.15
Figures 9.3 to 9.6 and table 9.1 combine the elements of the ﬁrst two ﬁg-
ures to compare certainty equivalents by earnings decile and equity port-
folio share for each of the four possible formulas for the traditional bene-
ﬁt. Figure 9.3 shows the results for the lowest earnings decile in the baseline
case: PRAs funded by contributions of 2 percent of taxable payroll, a co-
eﬃcient of relative risk aversion equal to 3, and real rates of return on as-
set classes—equity, corporate bonds, and government bonds—having the
values assumed by Goss and Wade (2005) in the Social Security Adminis-
308 Andrew A. Samwick
15. The extent of risk aversion can be illustrated by considering how much an individual
would pay to avoid a speciﬁed risk. Consider a 50-50 chance of having wealth increase or de-
crease by 25 percent. An individual with a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion of 3 would pay
about 9.1 percent of his or her wealth to avoid this risk. An investor with log utility (a coeﬃ-
cient of 1) would pay only 3.2 percent, while an investor with a coeﬃcient of relative risk aver-
sion of 5 would pay 13.5 percent.
Fig. 9.3 Certainty equivalents by beneﬁt formulas and equity shares, baseline
case, decile 1tration’s oﬃcial scoring of reform proposals: 6.2, 3.2, and 2.7 percent, re-
spectively.
The four curves in ﬁgure 9.3 correspond to the certainty equivalents as
a function of the PRA portfolio share in equity for the proportional re-
duction, progressive, half-and-half, and uniform beneﬁt formulas. In all
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Fig. 9.4 Certainty equivalents by beneﬁt formulas and equity shares, baseline
case, decile 4
Fig. 9.5 Certainty equivalents by beneﬁt formulas and equity shares, baseline
case, decile 7cases, the highest certainty equivalent occurs at a portfolio share of 100
percent in equities, where the curves intersect the right vertical axis. The
diﬀering degree of progressivity across the beneﬁt formulas means that the
formulas diﬀer in the level of the certainty equivalents at this optimal port-
folio share, with the most progressive beneﬁt formula having the highest
certainty equivalent. With a more progressive traditional beneﬁt, a worker
could choose to reduce the equity share—and with it, the volatility of the
PRA beneﬁt—while still surpassing the expected utility aﬀorded by a less
progressive beneﬁt formula. For example, with the uniform beneﬁt and the
half-and-half beneﬁt formula, a worker could allocate none of the PRA
portfolio to equity and still have a higher certainty equivalent than with the
proportional reduction beneﬁt formula and a 100 percent allocation to eq-
uity. This can be seen in ﬁgure 9.3 in the greater height of the uniform ben-
eﬁt and half-and-half curves on the left vertical axis than the proportional
reduction achieves on the right vertical axis. For the progressive formula,
an equity share as low as 50 percent is enough to exceed the certainty
equivalent generated by the proportional reduction and its optimal 100
percent equity share.
These comparisons are summarized in table 9.1. The ﬁrst panel shows
the maximum certainty equivalents for each beneﬁt formula (in the col-
umns) and each decile of the earnings distribution (in the rows), where the
maximum is chosen over equity shares that are multiples of 5 between 0
and 100. The second panel shows, for each earnings decile and beneﬁt for-
mula, the equity share that gives that maximum certainty equivalent. Fi-
nally, the bottom panel shows, for all beneﬁt formulas that are not the pro-
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Fig. 9.6 Certainty equivalents by beneﬁt formulas and equity shares, baseline
case, decile 10portional reduction, the lowest equity share (again, in multiples of 5), that
will surpass the maximum certainty equivalent available under the propor-
tional reduction. This panel will only have rows for earnings deciles in
which this is possible. For example, a uniform beneﬁt with an equity share
of zero surpasses a proportional reduction with any equity share (includ-
ing the maximum, at 100 percent) for the lowest three earnings deciles.
Figure 9.4 shows the same relationships for the earnings decile that is
fourth from the bottom (roughly the 35th percentile). The curves are in the
same order as in ﬁgure 9.3, and the maximum certainty equivalents con-
tinue to occur at portfolio allocations of 100 percent equity. However, the
vertical distances between the curves have narrowed because beneﬁt for-
mulas that have the same average payout but diﬀer in progressivity will re-
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Table 9.1 Optimal portfolio shares in equity, baseline case
Decile Proportional Progressive Half and half Uniform
Highest certainty equivalent
1 16,362 16,948 18,288 20,151
2 18,373 18,817 19,819 21,185
3 19,862 20,194 20,934 21,925
4 21,236 21,466 21,968 22,621
5 22,571 22,700 22,974 23,307
6 23,914 23,950 24,011 24,044
7 25,395 25,333 25,170 24,888
8 27,212 27,035 26,606 25,946
9 29,587 29,268 28,509 27,375
10 33,956 33,381 32,029 30,058
Optimal equity share of PRA portfolio
1 100 100 100 100
2 100 100 100 100
3 100 100 100 100
4 100 100 100 100
5 100 100 100 100
69 5 9 5 9 5 9 5
79 5 9 5 9 0 9 0
89 0 9 0 9 0 8 5
98 5 8 5 8 5 8 5
10 80 80 80 75
Lowest equity share with higher expected utility than proportional
15 0 0 0
26 0 1 5 0
37 0 3 5 0
47 5 5 0 3 0
58 0 6 5 5 0
69 0 8 0 8 0
Notes: Personal retirement accounts (PRAs) are funded by 2 percent contributions. Equity
returns average 6.2 percent (net of inﬂation and administrative costs). Utility is constant rel-
ative risk aversion, with a coeﬃcient of 3.distribute relatively less to the 4th decile than they do to the bottom decile.
The maximum certainty equivalent for the proportional reduction formula
can now be surpassed with equity allocations as low as 30 percent, 50 per-
cent, and 75 percent for the uniform beneﬁt, half-and-half, and progressive
beneﬁt formulas, respectively. The bottom panel of table 9.1 shows that
there is some potential for reducing the required exposure to equity by hav-
ing a more progressive beneﬁt formula for each of the bottom six deciles,
though the potential shrinks at higher deciles.
Figure 9.5 shows the same curves for the 7th decile (roughly the 65th per-
centile) of the earnings distribution. The ordering of the curves has now
switched, with the proportional reduction oﬀering the highest certainty
equivalents for each possible equity share, followed by the progressive,
half-and-half, and uniform beneﬁt formulas. This is not surprising, as the
redistribution toward the lower earning deciles must be paid for by those
in higher earning deciles if the reforms have the same aggregate payouts
but diﬀer in their progressivity. The optimal equity allocations have fallen
slightly, to 95 percent in equity for the proportional reduction and pro-
gressive formulas and to 90 percent in equity for the half-and-half and uni-
form beneﬁt formulas. All of the curves are quite close together, indicating
very little scope for trading oﬀ exposure to equity by switching beneﬁt for-
mulas. Figure 9.6 shows the curves for the top decile of the earnings distri-
bution. The curves retain the same ordering from ﬁgure 9.5, but the gaps
between the diﬀerent formulas are now much wider. The optimal share in
equity also falls to 75 percent for all four of the beneﬁt formulas.
Figure 9.7suggests why the progressivity of the beneﬁt formula is such a
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Fig. 9.7 CDFs for beneﬁts, 2 percent PRAs, 50 percent equity shares, decile 1powerful tool in comparison to the equity share of the PRA portfolio in
aﬀecting workers in the lower earnings deciles. The ﬁgure shows the cu-
mulative distribution functions for the four diﬀerent beneﬁt formulas,
holding constant the equity share of the PRA portfolio at 50 percent, for
the bottom earnings decile. For any given beneﬁt level, the height of the
curve shows the probability of the speciﬁed beneﬁt formula generating a
beneﬁt level that is at or below the given level. For curves that do not cross,
the curve that is everywhere the lowest represents the most preferred ben-
eﬁt formula. As noted in the preceding, for this low-earning worker, that is
the uniform beneﬁt. Indeed, for this beneﬁt formula, all of the variation in
beneﬁt levels is due to the variation in asset returns in diﬀerent scenarios.
Moving right to left on the graph, the other beneﬁt formulas lower average
beneﬁts and add successively more earnings risk into the beneﬁt distribu-
tions. The diﬀerences in the lowest beneﬁt amounts across formulas (mea-
sured by the horizontal distance between the curves near the horizontal
axis) are quite large. These diﬀerences also persist fairly high into the dis-
tribution of beneﬁts, disappearing only at the highest beneﬁt levels. Given
risk averse workers, the level and likelihood of very low outcomes are of
particular concern.
Figure 9.8 shows the variation in this decile’s beneﬁt distributions hold-
ing the beneﬁt formula ﬁxed (at proportional reduction) while varying the
equity share in the portfolio from 0 to 100 percent in increments of 25 per-
centage points. At the very lowest beneﬁt levels, the diﬀerences across the
portfolio allocations are quite small in comparison to those shown in ﬁg-
ure 9.7. (The scales on the axes are identical across the ﬁgures.) Low bene-
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Fig. 9.8 CDFs for beneﬁts, 2 percent PRAs, proportional reduction, decile 1ﬁt outcomes are primarily due to the factor held constant across the
curves—the traditional beneﬁt formula—rather than the factor varying
across the curves—the equity share in the PRA portfolio. To the extent
that there are diﬀerences, both the “all equity” and “zero equity” portfo-
lios have lower minimum beneﬁts than more balanced portfolios. At the
low end of the earnings distribution, reducing the equity share from 100
percent does not even generate a lower likelihood of very bad outcomes.
These ﬁgures establish the main results of the analysis. Given the as-
sumed average returns on equities and bonds and their historical variation,
workers with CRRA utility and a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion of 3
typically choose high equity shares in their PRA portfolios, regardless of
the formula used to compute the traditional beneﬁt. However, switching
from a proportional reduction in the traditional beneﬁts to any of the three
more progressive beneﬁt formulas increases the traditional beneﬁts going
to the bottom six deciles of the earnings distribution. This increase in tra-
ditional beneﬁts gives the worker room to lower the equity share in the
PRA portfolio while still achieving the same certainty equivalent available
with the optimal equity share in the PRA under the proportionally reduced
beneﬁt. In the case of the maximally progressive beneﬁt formula, in which
the traditional beneﬁt is a uniform beneﬁt unrelated to the worker’s earn-
ings, the equity share could fall to zero for the lowest three deciles. Higher
deciles or less extreme changes to the progressivity of the beneﬁt formula
result in somewhat smaller possible reductions in equity exposure.
9.6 Sensitivity Tests
In this section, the robustness of the main results is assessed by varying
the degree of risk aversion, the constancy of the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion, the equity premium, and the size of the PRAs measured by the
annual contributions as a percentage of earnings. More risk aversion, de-
clining relative risk aversion, a lower equity premium, and larger PRAs
generally reduce the optimal portfolio allocations in equities and slightly
compress the diﬀerences in the allocations across conﬁgurations of the tra-
ditional beneﬁt that achieve the same certainty equivalent. This section
concludes with a discussion of life-cycle portfolio strategies.
9.6.1 Risk Aversion
The baseline choice of the coeﬃcient of risk aversion is consistent with
assumptions found in the literature on insurance and risk. Table 9.2repeats
the analysis of table 9.1 for a higher coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
equal to 5. The ﬁrst consequence of higher relative risk aversion is that all
of the certainty equivalents in the top panel of table 9.2 are lower than their
counterparts in table 9.1. Consistent with ﬁgure 9.2, a worker with higher
risk aversion would pay a greater risk premium to avoid a given risk. The
314 Andrew A. Samwicknext panel of table 9.2 shows that the workers seek to avoid this risk by re-
ducing their equity shares in the PRA portfolio.16 For example, with the
proportional reduction, optimal equity shares are 95 percent in the lowest
earnings decile, falling to 60 percent by the highest earnings decile.
As shown in the bottom panel of the table, changes in the progressivity
of the traditional beneﬁt allow for reductions in equity exposure in the
PRA portfolio that are comparable to those for the less risk averse workers
in table 9.1. For example, it is still the case that the bottom six earnings
deciles have room to lower their equity exposure with more progressive tra-
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Table 9.2 Optimal portfolio shares in equity, higher risk aversion
Decile Proportional Progressive Half and half Uniform
Highest certainty equivalent
1 15,808 16,419 17,801 19,705
2 17,582 18,059 19,124 20,547
3 18,927 19,298 20,111 21,168
4 20,173 20,447 21,032 21,762
5 21,405 21,578 21,934 22,349
6 22,622 22,706 22,858 22,982
7 23,966 23,952 23,885 23,703
8 25,648 25,515 25,179 24,630
9 27,787 27,519 26,869 25,866
10 31,823 31,297 30,054 28,223
Optimal equity share of PRA portfolio
1 95 95 100 100
28 5 8 5 9 0 9 0
38 5 8 5 8 5 8 5
48 0 8 0 8 0 8 0
57 5 7 5 7 5 7 5
67 5 7 5 7 5 7 5
77 0 7 0 7 0 7 0
87 0 7 0 7 0 6 5
96 5 6 5 6 5 6 0
10 60 60 60 55
Lowest equity share with higher expected utility than proportional
12 5 0 0
23 5 0 0
34 5 1 0 0
45 0 2 5 0
55 5 3 5 2 0
66 0 5 0 4 5
Notes: Personal retirement accounts (PRAs) are funded by 2 percent contributions. Equity
returns average 6.2 percent (net of inﬂation and administrative costs). Utility is constant rel-
ative risk aversion, with a coeﬃcient of 5.
16. In other words, the certainty equivalents would be even lower if the workers were con-
strained to hold the equity shares at the levels in the middle panel of table 9.1.ditional beneﬁt formulas. In addition, the allowable percentage point re-
ductions in the equity shares are similar. For example, with a uniform ben-
eﬁt, the bottom four deciles can now eliminate their equity exposure en-
tirely. With the progressive beneﬁt formula, the equity share for the bottom
earnings decile can fall from 95 to 25 percent without a loss in expected
utility. Thus, the main results are robust to a higher coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion.
9.6.2 Declining Relative Risk Aversion
The results in the middle panels of tables 9.1 and 9.2 show that the opti-
mal allocation to equity declines at higher earnings deciles. This pattern
arises due to the maintained assumption in the simulations that workers
have no other sources of retirement income apart from the traditional ben-
eﬁt and the PRA. Because even the current Social Security formula is pro-
gressive, workers in lower earnings deciles have a greater proportion of
their retirement beneﬁts insulated from investment risk. With a homo-
thetic expected utility function, this enables lower earning workers to take
on more equity risk in their PRA portfolios.17
This pattern is counterfactual—in reality, investment allocations to eq-
uity rise dramatically with earnings.18 One way to make the simulations
more consistent with observed investment behavior is to modify the ex-
pected utility function to exhibit declining, rather than constant, relative
risk aversion. The simplest such modiﬁcation to make is to introduce a
“subsistence level” of retirement beneﬁt into the utility function, via the
parameter k in:
u(b)   .
Note that k   0 corresponds to CRRA utility and that with k greater
than zero, utility is not deﬁned for retirement beneﬁt levels below k. For
retirement beneﬁt levels above k, utility is measured relative to the sub-
sistence level. Because low-earning deciles have beneﬁts closest to this
subsistence level, they will lower their equity allocations relative to the
CRRA case. The certainty equivalent for this declining relative risk aver-
sion (DRRA) expected utility function is given by:
bCE   k   {(1    )E[u(b)]}1/(1  )   k   {E[(b   k)1  ]}1/(1  ).
(b   k)1  
  
1   
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17. This assumption also generates the tendency for more progressive beneﬁt formulas to
have higher optimal allocations to equity for the bottom earnings deciles and lower optimal
allocations to equity for the top earnings deciles. Greater progressivity results in more non-
PRA beneﬁts at low earnings deciles and less non-PRA beneﬁts, relative to lifetime earnings,
at high earnings deciles.
18. See, for example, the tabulations in Bucks, Kennickell, and Moore (2006) or the multi-
variate estimates in Poterba and Samwick (2003), both based on data from the Surveys of
Consumer Finances.Tables 9.3 and 9.4 repeat the analyses in tables 9.1 and 9.2 using this
DRRA expected utility function. The subsistence level is assumed to be
$10,000, which is close to the minimum beneﬁt for the lowest earning decile
shown in ﬁgure 9.7. The top panels of the tables show that the certainty
equivalents are lower when expected utility exhibits declining rather than
constant relative risk aversion.19 The middle panels of the tables show that
optimal equity allocations are also lower with declining relative risk aver-
sion.
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Table 9.3 Optimal portfolio shares in equity, declining relative risk aversion
Decile Proportional Progressive Half and half Uniform
Highest certainty equivalent
1 15,199 15,946 17,516 19,558
2 17,010 17,605 18,842 20,398
3 18,423 18,894 19,856 21,028
4 19,746 20,101 20,809 21,634
5 21,094 21,320 21,760 22,240
6 22,386 22,510 22,724 22,893
7 23,858 23,862 23,819 23,648
8 25,691 25,555 25,206 24,626
9 28,002 27,711 27,014 25,941
10 32,366 31,796 30,454 28,472
Optimal equity share of PRA portfolio
17 5 8 0 9 0 9 5
27 5 7 5 8 0 8 5
37 5 7 5 8 0 8 0
47 5 7 5 7 5 8 0
57 5 7 5 7 5 7 5
67 0 7 0 7 5 7 0
77 0 7 0 7 0 7 0
87 0 7 0 7 0 6 5
97 0 7 0 6 5 6 5
10 65 65 60 60
Lowest equity share with higher expected utility than proportional
10 0 0
22 0 0 0
33 0 0 0
44 0 1 5 0
55 0 3 0 1 5
65 5 4 5 3 5
Notes: Personal retirement accounts (PRAs) are funded by 2 percent contributions. Equity
returns average 6.2 percent (net of inﬂation and administrative costs). Utility is declining rel-
ative risk aversion, with a coeﬃcient of 3 and subsistence level of 10,000.
19. The degree of relative risk aversion for any expected utility function is given by –b   u ( )/
u ( ). For the DRRA utility function, this expression is  ∗b/(b – k), which is equal to the con-
stant   for k   0. When k   0, this expression declines toward   as b increases.However, comparisons of the changes in the optimal equity allocations
by earnings decile and across traditional beneﬁt formulas relative to the
CRRA case are not straightforward. For example, with   3, equity
shares with a proportional reduction in the traditional beneﬁt fall from 75
to 65 percent over the earnings deciles, compared to a decline from 100 to
80 percent in the CRRA case, indicating less sensitivity to earnings decile.
However, with a uniform beneﬁt, they fall from 95 to 60 percent over the
earnings deciles, compared to a decline from 100 to 75 percent in the
CRRA case, indicating more sensitivity to earnings decile. Similar results
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Table 9.4 Optimal portfolio shares in equity, higher and declining relative risk
aversion
Decile Proportional Progressive Half and half Uniform
Highest certainty equivalent
1 14,533 15,356 17,018 19,109
2 16,100 16,791 18,166 19,822
3 17,324 17,913 19,053 20,358
4 18,510 18,986 19,891 20,872
5 19,783 20,120 20,749 21,391
6 20,898 21,154 21,585 21,939
7 22,305 22,414 22,564 22,577
8 24,063 24,010 23,827 23,418
9 26,088 25,889 25,377 24,524
10 30,199 29,705 28,529 26,748
Optimal equity share of PRA portfolio
15 5 6 0 6 5 7 5
25 0 5 5 6 0 6 5
35 5 5 5 6 0 6 0
45 0 5 5 5 5 6 0
55 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
65 0 5 0 5 0 5 0
75 0 5 0 5 0 5 0
85 0 5 0 5 0 4 5
95 0 5 0 5 0 4 5
10 45 45 45 40
Lowest equity share with higher expected utility than proportional
10 0 0
20 0 0
31 0 0 0
41 5 0 0
52 5 0 0
63 0 1 0 0
74 0 3 0 3 0
Notes: Personal retirement accounts (PRAs) are funded by 2 percent contributions. Equity
returns average 6.2 percent (net of inﬂation and administrative costs). Utility is declining rel-
ative risk aversion, with a coeﬃcient of 5 and subsistence level of 10,000.hold for the higher risk aversion in table 9.4 and in the diﬀerences across
columns in the respective cases.
Nonetheless, the bottom panels of the tables show that changing from a
proportional reduction to a more progressive beneﬁt formula can lessen
equity exposure by as much or more than in the CRRA case. For example,
with   3, the bottom six deciles can again have their equity exposure re-
duced. With a uniform beneﬁt, the bottom four deciles can reduce equity
exposure to zero without falling behind the proportional reduction. The
6th decile can lower its equity share from 70 to 35 percent, compared to a
reduction from 95 to 80 percent in the CRRA case shown in table 9.1. With
the progressive formula, the bottom decile can reduce its equity exposure
down to zero, and the 6th decile can reduce its equity share from 75 to 55
percent (compared to a reduction from 95 to 90 percent in the CRRA
case). The results in table 9.4 at higher risk aversion levels are even more
pronounced. Thus, the main results shown in the previous section are ro-
bust to and strengthened by a switch to an expected utility function that ex-
hibits declining rather than constant relative risk aversion.
9.6.3 Lower Equity Premium
The sustainability of the premium that has existed to investments in eq-
uities historically has been the subject of considerable debate. Particularly
in the case of ﬁnancial market returns, past performance may be an unre-
liable guide to future outcomes. For example, if over the past thirty years,
systematic risk in the stock market fell, then the appropriate rate of return
to assume going forward would be lower. However, during this period of
time that risk fell, the reduction in risk would have generated abnormally
high returns to equity. These high holding period returns would have arisen
precisely because future ex ante returns had fallen and would thus be a
poor guide to forecasting those future returns.20
In light of such considerations, table 9.5 reports the results of simula-
tions in which the expected return on equities is lowered from 6.2 percent
to 4.7 percent. Personal retirement account contributions remain 2 per-
cent of earnings per year, and the comparisons are shown for a CRRA util-
ity function with a relative risk aversion coeﬃcient of 3. As expected, the
150 basis point reduction in the equity premium lowers the certainty equiv-
alents for all earnings deciles and beneﬁt formulas, shown in the top panel.
The lower equity premium also shifts the optimal portfolio allocations to
lower equity. For the proportional reduction, equity shares range from 85
to 55 percent, compared to 100 to 80 percent in table 9.1. For the uniform
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20. For a discussion of the issues associated with choosing a real return on stocks for the
long term, see the papers by John Campbell, Peter Diamond, and John Shoven in Social Se-
curity Advisory Board (2001).beneﬁt, equity shares range from 95 to 50 percent, compared to 100 to 75
percent in table 9.1.
With a lower equity premium, there is greater scope for changes in the
progressivity of the beneﬁt formula to substitute for higher equity alloca-
tions. The bottom panel of table 9.5 shows that with a uniform beneﬁt, the
bottom four deciles can reduce their equity shares to zero to keep pace with
the optimal allocations of 75 to 85 percent in the proportional reduction
case. The 6th decile can reduce its equity share to 45 percent from 65 per-
cent. In table 9.1, with the higher equity premium, this decile could reduce
its equity share only to 80 percent from 95 percent. Possible reductions in
equity exposure for other beneﬁt formulas are smaller than with the uni-
form beneﬁt formula but similarly larger than their counterparts with the
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Table 9.5 Optimal portfolio shares in equity, lower equity returns
Decile Proportional Progressive Half and half Uniform
Highest certainty equivalent
1 15,473 16,045 17,355 19,178
2 17,265 17,694 18,662 19,984
3 18,596 18,916 19,628 20,580
4 19,820 20,040 20,522 21,147
5 21,023 21,146 21,407 21,723
6 22,220 22,255 22,312 22,340
7 23,549 23,490 23,334 23,061
8 25,162 24,994 24,588 23,963
9 27,275 26,972 26,256 25,192
10 31,185 30,639 29,366 27,510
Optimal equity share of PRA portfolio
18 5 9 0 9 0 9 5
28 0 8 0 8 0 8 5
37 5 7 5 7 5 7 5
47 5 7 5 7 5 7 5
57 0 7 0 7 0 7 0
66 5 6 5 6 5 6 5
76 5 6 5 6 5 6 0
86 0 6 0 6 0 6 0
96 0 6 0 5 5 5 5
10 55 55 50 50
Lowest equity share with higher expected utility than proportional
10 0 0
21 5 0 0
32 5 0 0
43 5 5 0
54 5 2 5 5
65 5 5 0 4 5
Notes: Personal retirement accounts (PRAs) are funded by 2 percent contributions. Equity
returns average 4.7 percent (net of inﬂation and administrative costs). Utility is constant rel-
ative risk aversion, with a coeﬃcient of 3.higher equity premium in table 9.1. Thus, the main results in the previous
section are robust and even strengthened in the presence of a lower equity
premium.
9.6.4 Larger Personal Retirement Accounts
Compared to the investment-based reform plans that have been pro-
posed (see note 2), a PRA funded by only a 2 percent contribution is fairly
small. The ability of progressivity in the traditional beneﬁt to oﬀset ﬁnan-
cial risk in the PRAs depends on the relative size of the two beneﬁts. To in-
vestigate this dependence and extend the analysis to cover more of the
range of proposed reforms, table 9.6 presents the results of simulations in
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Table 9.6 Optimal portfolio shares in equity, larger personal retirement accounts
(PRAs)
Decile Proportional Progressive Half and half Uniform
Highest certainty equivalent
1 17,628 18,231 19,608 21,522
2 20,000 20,460 21,500 22,921
3 21,780 22,126 22,898 23,936
4 23,440 23,681 24,213 24,908
5 25,066 25,205 25,503 25,874
6 26,725 26,771 26,854 26,921
7 28,569 28,515 28,371 28,118
8 30,872 30,698 30,279 29,639
9 33,896 33,578 32,824 31,702
10 39,522 38,941 37,579 35,590
Optimal equity share of PRA portfolio
1 100 100 100 100
2 95 95 100 100
39 5 9 5 9 5 9 5
49 0 9 0 9 0 9 0
58 5 8 5 8 5 8 5
68 5 8 5 8 5 8 5
78 0 8 0 8 0 8 0
88 0 8 0 8 0 7 5
97 5 7 5 7 5 7 5
10 70 70 70 65
Lowest equity share with higher expected utility than proportional
15 0 0 0
26 0 2 5 0
36 5 3 5 1 0
47 0 5 0 3 0
57 0 6 0 4 5
68 0 7 0 6 5
Notes: PRAs are funded by 3 percent contributions. Equity returns average 6.2 percent (net
of inﬂation and administrative costs). Utility is constant relative risk aversion, with a coeﬃ-
cient of 3.which the annual PRA contribution is increased from 2 to 3 percent of
earnings. The certainty equivalents in the top panel are all naturally higher
than their counterparts in table 9.1 because the additional 1 percent con-
tributions are not accounted for by reduced consumption elsewhere in this
framework. The middle panel of the table shows that optimal equity allo-
cations are slightly lower with the larger PRAs. As the PRAs get larger rel-
ative to the traditional beneﬁt, workers seek to mitigate their risk exposure
through lower allocations to equity.
The bottom panel shows that the ability to oﬀset equity exposure
through more progressive traditional beneﬁt formulas can be slightly lower
or higher, depending on the earnings decile and beneﬁt formula. With a
uniform beneﬁt, the bottom two deciles can reduce their equity shares to
zero to keep pace with the optimal allocations of 95 to 100 percent in the
proportional reduction case. In table 9.1, with the smaller PRAs, the bot-
tom three deciles could eliminate all equity exposure. The 6th decile can re-
duce its equity share to 65 percent from 85 percent, compared to a reduc-
tion to 80 percent from 95 percent in table 9.1. For the progressive beneﬁt
formula, reductions in equity exposure relative to the proportional reduc-
tion formula are comparable to those in table 9.1.
9.6.5 Life-Cycle Portfolios
As noted in the preceding, prior studies have analyzed the use of life-
cycle investment strategies to mitigate ﬁnancial risk in PRAs. Figure 9.9
compares a portfolio with an age-invariant allocation of 50 percent to eq-
uity with three life-cycle strategies that shift from equity to bonds as re-
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Fig. 9.9 CDFs for beneﬁts, life-cycle allocations, baseline, proportional reduction,
decile 1tirement approaches. The ﬁrst starts at a 95 percent equity share and de-
creases 2 percentage points per year, reaching 5 percent on the eve of re-
tirement. The second starts at an 83.75 percent equity share and decreases
1.5 percentage points per year, reaching 16.25 percent on the eve of retire-
ment. The third starts at a 72.5 percent equity share and decreases by 1 per-
centage point per year, reaching 27.5 percent on the eve of retirement. All
three strategies are centered on a 50 percent equity share, based on the
simple average of the allocation rules by age. The ﬁgure pertains to the low-
est earnings decile and shows the cumulative distribution functions for
each of the four investment options.
There are two important features of the graph. First, the curves all lie
virtually on top of each other. There cannot be much of an improvement in
expected utility by switching to a life-cycle strategy if such a strategy results
in a distribution of beneﬁts that is so similar to the age-invariant portfolio
allocation. Second, the life-cycle strategies lie above the age-invariant port-
folio for all but the very lowest percentiles of the distributions, the more so
the greater the decline in the equity allocation with age. The reason is that
the life-cycle strategies do not have the same expected beneﬁts as the age-
invariant portfolio because the life-cycle strategies focus the high-equity al-
locations on the early years, when many years of contributions are yet to
be made.
Thus, life-cycle strategies may be desirable, but this is so in the current
context primarily because they serve to reduce the overall level of equity
exposure. This may be a desirable goal—for example, if the equity pre-
mium is low enough or volatility of returns is high enough—but it can
be achieved more straightforwardly with a simple reduction in the age-
invariant portfolio share in equities given the parameters used in the pre-
ceding simulations.
9.7 Conclusions
Policymakers seeking to design investment-based Social Security reform
proposals have wrestled with the issue of how much ﬁnancial risk is ap-
propriate for individuals to bear. Suggested methods of alleviating risk
have focused on strategies that amount to requiring more bonds relative to
equity in the PRAs, whether through the purchase of guarantees or life-
cycle investment strategies. It is worth emphasizing that most of the simu-
lations in this chapter suggest fairly high optimal allocations to equities,
particularly by those in the lowest deciles of the earnings distribution. Direct
restrictions on equity holding in PRAs are likely to prove unpopular, par-
ticularly among those whose opportunities are most broadened by the
chance to invest their mandatory contributions in equities. This chapter
suggests another possibility for alleviating the consequences of ﬁnancial risk,
namely, increasing the progressivity of the traditional beneﬁt. Doing so in-
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bly adverse shocks to ﬁnancial returns without constraining them to not
invest in equities.
The main simulations in the chapter compare proportional reductions in
traditional beneﬁts with more progressive reductions. The key ﬁnding is
that under baseline parameters, the most progressive traditional beneﬁt—
a ﬂat beneﬁt independent of earnings—allows the allocation to equities to
be reduced to zero for the lowest three earnings deciles relative to the opti-
mal allocation when the traditional beneﬁts are reduced proportionately
based on the current formula. The next three deciles are able to achieve
some reduction in equity exposure as well. Under less extreme changes to
the traditional beneﬁt, such as that proposed by Liebman, MacGuineas,
and Samwick (2005), the allocation to equities can be decreased by half for
the lowest earnings decile and by smaller fractions for an additional ﬁve
deciles. Sensitivity tests show that optimal allocations to equities typically
decrease with higher risk aversion, declining risk aversion, a lower equity
premium, or larger accounts, but the general pattern of results persists and
in some cases allows for greater equity reduction through higher progres-
sivity in the traditional beneﬁt formula.
The results in this chapter suggest two avenues for further research.
First, the present analysis used a very stylized model of the initial earnings
distribution and its evolution over time to simulate the distribution of fu-
ture beneﬁts. Actual data and more sophisticated time series estimates
could be incorporated. Second, the present analysis focused on time-
invariant portfolio allocations in the PRAs, which were further assumed to
be the worker’s only source of investment wealth. While the latter might be
a reasonable approximation for the lowest earning households, higher
earning households are likely to have existing holdings of equities that
make the portfolio allocation decision in the PRA less consequential. Ex-
tending the current framework to allow for optimal, age-dependent port-
folio allocations and for saving in accounts other than the PRAs would
provide better estimates of the extent to which greater progressivity can
protect low earners from investment risk and of the size of the welfare costs
paid by higher earners for providing this protection.
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Table 9A.1 Mean beneﬁts by earnings decile
Traditional beneﬁts
Decile Current law Proportional Progressive Half and half Uniform
1 22,033 13,220 13,739 14,949 16,678
2 23,851 14,311 14,666 15,494 16,678
3 25,127 15,076 15,317 15,877 16,678
4 26,212 15,727 15,870 16,203 16,678
5 27,227 16,336 16,388 16,507 16,678
6 28,181 16,908 16,874 16,793 16,678
7 29,177 17,506 17,382 17,092 16,678
8 30,304 18,182 17,956 17,430 16,678
9 31,726 19,036 18,682 17,857 16,678
10 34,130 20,478 19,907 18,578 16,678
All 27,797 16,678 16,678 16,678 16,678
Real annuities from 2% PRAs, real equity returns average 6.2%
No equity 25% equity 50% equity 75% equity All equity
1 2,069 2,532 3,125 3,884 4,858
2 2,840 3,481 4,307 5,377 6,769
3 3,451 4,226 5,225 6,516 8,184
4 4,015 4,915 6,075 7,575 9,524
5 4,590 5,621 6,948 8,659 10,871
6 5,234 6,402 7,896 9,813 12,278
7 5,974 7,321 9,056 11,298 14,198
8 6,901 8,448 10,435 12,996 16,302
9 8,185 10,021 12,379 15,426 19,382
10 10,498 12,907 16,008 20,009 25,171
All 5,376 6,587 8,145 10,155 12,754
Real annuities from 2% PRAs, real equity returns average 4.7%
No equity 25% equity 50% equity 75% equity All equity
1 2,069 2,303 2,570 2,875 3,220
2 2,840 3,166 3,544 3,981 4,489
3 3,451 3,844 4,298 4,822 5,424
4 4,015 4,471 4,996 5,604 6,306
5 4,590 5,113 5,715 6,409 7,206
6 5,234 5,822 6,493 7,259 8,132
7 5,974 6,658 7,446 8,355 9,401
8 6,901 7,681 8,576 9,605 10,786
9 8,185 9,106 10,164 11,383 12,793
10 10,498 11,715 13,113 14,713 16,541
All 5,376 5,988 6,692 7,500 8,430
Note: PRA   personal retirement account.References
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Comment Michael Hurd
An important aspect of the debate about personal retirement accounts con-
cerns their investment in equities. On the one side, a main reason for having
personal retirement accounts is that indeed they can be invested in equities
that historically have a greater rate of return than bonds and a much greater
rate of return than the internal rate of return on Social Security contribu-
tions. On the other side is the risk that comes with the higher mean rate of
return: there are signiﬁcant chances that a worker could end up worse oﬀ
than under a Social Security system that has no personal retirement ac-
counts. Of particular concern is the risk to low-wage workers who are
unlikely to have other resources to buﬀer against bad outcomes. Conse-
quently, there have been a number of proposals to provide insurance against
these unfavorable outcomes. This chapter points out that the debate need
not be restricted to personal retirement accounts within the structure of the
existing Social Security system. Some of the risk from low rates of return in
private retirement accounts could be partially oﬀset by increased progres-
sivity in the Social Security program. This is an interesting alternative to in-
surance against bad outcomes on rates of return and in some ways would be
preferable: insurance has the undesirable eﬀect of reducing the mean rate of
return on equities because of the cost of insurance. Or said diﬀerently, in-
surance reduces the amount invested in equities partly oﬀsetting the main
reason for having personal retirement account in the ﬁrst place.
The simulations show that there is considerable scope for investing in eq-
uities in personal retirement accounts while protecting the bottom part of
the income distribution via an increase in the progressivity of the Social Se-
curity system. For example, in ﬁgure 9.1, the “half-and-half” progressivity
structure with no investment in equity will provide greater expected utility
for a typical worker in the bottom income decile than the existing structure
fully invested in equities. At the same time, those in the top income decile
could invest about 80 percent in equities and achieve greater expected util-
ity than under the present structure but with no equities (ﬁgure 9.6). Said
diﬀerently, compared with the present situation, the bottom decile could
have greater expected utility and no investment risk, and the top decile
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